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Response 
Keeping Republics Republican 
Rob Atkinson 
Several months ago I told Brian Galle I had accepted the offer of Texas 
Law Review See Also to comment on his article, Keep Charity Charitable.1  
He remarked, with his typically casual candor, “I’d have asked someone I 
disagree with more.”2  The title of Professor Galle’s article nicely identifies 
our common ground: he now believes, very much as I once believed, in the 
wisdom of keeping charity charitable and meeting a wide range of basic 
social needs through nonprofit or “third sector” organizations, as opposed to 
for-profit firms on the one hand and government agencies on the other.  
Professor Galle’s article addresses a position with which he and I both 
disagree: one that would cede a more-or-less large portion of the traditional 
field of charity to for-profit firms—in this particular dustup, those who favor 
“for-profit charity” over “charitable charity.”3 
 
1. Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1213 (2010). 
2. This exchange took place in my office at the Florida State University College of Law.  I 
should say at the outset that Professor Galle is a former faculty colleague of mine with whom I have 
always been on the most cordial, if not the closest, of terms.  Discount my comments accordingly. 
Professor Galle’s observation itself—particularly the premise “someone I disagree with more”—
needs elaboration.  To put it a bit more positively, he and I have agreed on a wide range of the 
issues he addresses in his article and elsewhere.  To put it a bit more precisely, his position on those 
issues is quite close to the position I maintained over the last two decades or so—until, indeed, very 
recently.  For an example of Galle’s critiques of contemporary theories on charity, see Brian D. 
Galle, Foundation or Empire?  The Role of Charity in a Federal System (Fla. State Univ. College of 
Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 394, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1473107. 
3. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for 
Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 604 (2009) (arguing that corporations should engage in 
philanthropy if they have a cost or quality advantage over nonprofit organizations and the 
government); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 
2017, 2064–67 (2007) (proposing that tax benefits designed to promote charitable activities should 
not be conditioned on the nonprofit form); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of 
Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227, 253 (calling for “the creation of private, for-
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In the first Part of this Response, I place Professor Galle’s debate with 
this pro-profit position in a larger context, to better see this debate as one 
battle in a larger—and largely successful—defense against a peculiar kind of 
for-profit irredentism.4  In the second Part of this Response, I take up my 
differences with Professor Galle—differences which are, I should admit here 
at the outset, the result of my own change of positions.  Make no mistake: I 
have not gone over to the cause of our common opponents on the right, the 
for-profit irredentists.  I have instead defected to the left, the side of charity’s 
older, if less popular, competitor—the governmental sector.  I have come to 
believe that a large part of charity’s domain should be ceded, not to the for-
profit sector, but to the state.  Professor Galle, by contrast, defends that 
frontier of charity as well, though more in other articles than in this one.5 
In the third and final Part, I invite both you and Professor Galle to join 
me in my new position, where I suggest we will all find ourselves much more 
at home.  At very least, here we will have the best of hosts: The University of 
Texas, which, notably, is neither a new-fangled for-profit charity nor a 
traditional charitable charity, but rather a republican philanthropy in the 
classical tradition of both republicanism and philanthropy. 
I. Cannons to the Right of Him: Locating Prof. Galle’s Gallant Charge 
Against “For-Profit Charity” in a Larger Theatre 
As Professor Galle notes, both his argument for charitable charity and 
the arguments of his opponents for for-profit charity have a common source: 
the work of the legal economist Henry Hansmann.  In three articles in the 
early 1980s, Professor Hansmann determined the course of debate on 
philanthropy, at least in law schools and economics departments, for the 
better part of three decades.  The first article gave an impressive economic 
account of the role of nonprofit organizations as responses to particular forms 
of market failure.6  The other two articles drew out of that descriptive 
account its normative implications for the duties of nonprofit fiduciaries7 and 
an argument for the exemption of nonprofits’ income from taxation.8 
 
profit, monitoring companies . . . that would contract with nonprofit entities for the right to sue them 
to enforce charitable obligations, fiduciary duties, and certain members’ rights”). 
4. In this campaign, as Professor Galle’s remark rightly implied, he and I have long been allies. 
5. See Galle, supra note 2, at 77 (arguing that nonprofits improve the quality of public goods by 
providing needed competition for the government). 
6. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 845 (1980). 
7. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 
504 (1981) (explaining that in circumstances of market failure, nonprofit firms appropriately act as 
fiduciaries for their donors because they can give donors “greater assurance that the services they 
desire will in fact be performed as they wish”). 
8. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate 
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72 (1981) (arguing that nonprofit exemption from income 
taxation “serves to compensate for difficulties that nonprofits have in raising capital, and that such a 
capital subsidy can promote efficiency when employed in those industries in which nonprofit firms 
serve consumers better than their for-profit counterparts”). 
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Nonprofit firms, in Hansmann’s descriptive theory, do what all private 
firms are supposed to do—give consumers what they want at the lowest 
possible cost—in conditions of what he called “contract failure.”9  These 
conditions, typically information asymmetries between for-profits and their 
patrons, or external benefits to third parties, create opportunities for for-profit 
firms systematically to exploit consumers by failing to deliver goods or 
services of the quality or quantity promised.10  Nonprofit firms, Hansmann 
noted, offer an inherent efficiency advantage in precisely these conditions. 
The nondistribution constraint, which defines nonprofit firms by denying 
private persons any proprietary claim on their net revenues,11 means that 
nonprofits’ managers simply have no legal incentive to skimp on quality or 
quantity of production as a means of increasing distributable profits.12   This 
special market-correcting, contract-reinforcing role of nonprofits, in turn, 
warrants both especially favorable tax treatment13 and especially rigorous 
fiduciary duties.14 
All serious subsequent scholarship on these issues has disagreed with 
Hansmann, in either of two predictable directions.  One group of scholars, 
myself among them, has argued that both the function of philanthropy and 
the basis for its favorable tax treatment lie in its advancement of non-
efficiency goals, especially wealth redistribution15 and non-consumerist 
definitions of the common good.16  The other group, led in the legal literature 
by Mark Hall and John Colombo, have accepted Hansmann’s focus on 
efficiency and offered refinements of his basic market-correcting 
hypothesis.17  Taking Hansmann’s efficiency criterion as their own makes 
 
9. See Hansmann, supra note 6, at 844–45. 
10. See Hansmann, supra note 8, at 69 (explaining that “[c]ontract failure arises when . . . the 
purchasers of the service . . . are likely to have difficulty in (1) comparing the quality of 
performance offered by competing providers before a purchase is made, or (2) determining, after a 
purchase is made, whether the service was actually performed as promised,” allowing for-profit 
corporations “to charge excessive prices for inferior service”). 
11. Id. at 56. 
12. Id. at 69. 
13. See id. at 74 (arguing that where nonprofits are more efficient than their for-profit 
counterparts, “the cost of the capital subsidy provided by corporate tax exemption may be more than 
compensated for by the efficiency gains deriving from the expansion of nonprofit producers that the 
subsidy encourages”). 
14. See Hansmann, supra note 7, at 524 (suggesting that nonprofits should be allowed only 
gradually to expand beyond the areas in which they are established because in these areas, the 
normative constraints that “assur[e] that nonprofits adhere to their fiduciary obligations” are 
weaker). 
15. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 633–34 
& n.373 (1990) (positing “a redistributive element as a precondition of exemption of organizations 
engaged in particular activities” and noting that the recent trend away from such a requirement has 
not gone unchallenged). 
16. See, e.g., id. at 619 (arguing that altruism as the basis for the tax exemption of nonprofit 
organizations is “a deliberate social policy choice that must be made on non-efficiency grounds”). 
17. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals  
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 387–89 (1991) [hereinafter 
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this second group of critics the more sympathetic; rejecting that criterion 
makes the first group the more radical.  Because both Professor Galle and his 
opponents belong to the more sympathetic critics, they will be our initial 
focus. 
Hansmann himself, very much to his credit, anticipated and 
acknowledged this second source of criticism.  Hansmann was extremely 
careful in making his original claims for the greater efficiency of nonprofits; 
in particular, he noted two critical qualifications.  First, the nondistribution 
constraint, which predictably cuts in nonprofits’ favor in conditions of 
market failure, is a dangerously two-edged sword.  On the one hand, it 
removes the incentive of nonprofits’ managers to skimp on quality or 
quantity of production as a means of increasing distributable profits, since 
nonprofit managers have no legal claim on net profits.18   But, on the other 
hand, the nondistribution constraint threatens to undercut any such nonprofit 
advantage by removing, along with the temptation to exploit consumers, a 
major incentive to minimize production costs: the very prospect of passing 
those cost savings along to themselves in the form of higher net revenues.19  
The nondistribution constraint, in other words, is no guarantee against 
slacking, nor, in the absence of adequate enforcement mechanisms, is it a 
guarantee against outright theft.  For nonprofits to be truly more efficient, 
then, even in the conditions of contract failure in which Hansmann shows 
they are likely to arise, either nonprofit managers must be virtuous or their 
predictable vices (slacking and stealing) must be contained by regulation.20 
 
Hall & Colombo, Charitable Status] (critiquing Hansmann’s capital subsidy theory on efficiency 
grounds); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax 
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1389–1421 (1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo, Donative 
Theory] (using market theory to rationalize the subsidization of donative institutions). 
18. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
19. See Hansmann, supra note 6, at 878 (explaining that the profit motive improves managerial 
efficiency). 
20. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals  The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit 
and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 466 (1996) (arguing that the 
“nondistribution constraint alone cannot assure the patron that his donation (or fee) will achieve his 
intent”); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance  Transforming 
Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 904–05 (2007) (advocating the creation of an 
enforceable duty of obedience for nonprofit organizations that requires directors to strive for 
charitable goals); see also BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 14 (1988) (noting 
that “restriction[s] on [nonprofits’] freedom to pay out profits” undermines an important motive for 
productive efficiency).  Lack of information is a major source of dissatisfaction with the proprietary 
form of institution.  Nonprofits are thus preferable on efficiency grounds to for-profit alternate 
suppliers only when this efficiency loss is more than offset by the efficiency gains the contract 
failure theory predicts.  See WEISBROD, supra, at 14–15 (noting that the “special advantages granted 
to nonprofits carry the potential for achieving private gain without social benefit”); Hansmann, 
supra note 6, at 877–79 (noting that the protection afforded by the nondistribution constraint only 
gives nonprofits a competitive edge if it outweighs the disadvantages that nonprofit firms face in 
terms of limitations on raising capital, the possibility of cross-subsidization, and the lack of 
incentives for managerial efficiency and entry and growth). 
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This brings us to Hansmann’s second qualification: To say that 
nonprofits, even under these optimum conditions, are more efficient than for-
profits is not to say that nonprofits are the most efficient alternatives in any 
absolute sense.  Hansmann, with his typical care, always noted other 
alternatives: professionalization and other forms of government regulation of 
for-profit providers,21 legal prohibition of for-profit suppliers,22 and even 
government provision of products marked by contract failure.23 
A fairly large literature has explored Hansmann’s first qualification, the 
risk that nonprofits will simply squander or steal any efficiency gains 
associated with the nondistribution constraint.24  Another fairly large 
literature has explored Hansmann’s second qualification, the prospect that 
alternatives to nonprofit suppliers may provide more efficient means of 
addressing contract failure in private firms.  A subset of this second literature 
explores mechanisms that for-profit firms themselves might use to overcome 
contract failure.  Some of those to whom Professor Galle addresses his article 
belong to this second school.25  Much of their work, particularly in its earlier 
phase, focused on what would seem to be an anomaly under Hansmann’s 
contract failure theory: for-profit firms engaging in paradigmatically 
charitable activities.26 
On closer inspection, however, these anomalies tend at least as much to 
confirm Hansmann’s model as to undercut it.  Particularly in the case of 
 
21. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 7, at 543–44 (explaining how codes of ethics have 
provided effective regulation of the legal profession). 
22. See, e.g., id. at 545 (noting a proposal to eliminate for-profit nursing facilities). 
23. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 6, at 894–95 (discussing the advantages that governmental 
organizations have in the provision of public and private services); see also Michael Krashinsky, 
Transaction Costs and a Theory of the Nonprofit Organization (suggesting that warranties and 
middlemen are alternatives to the nondistribution constraint), in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT 
INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 114, 117 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). 
24. Some of this work has been empirical, examining whether nonprofits in particular industries 
are, in fact, more efficient.  See Richard Steinberg, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations 
(noting mixed empirical data on the extent to which nonprofit managers incur high administrative 
costs and engage in managerial emoluments), in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK 117, 127–28 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg, eds., 2d ed. 2006).  Hansmann 
himself has done some of this work.  See Henry Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other 
Factors on the Market Share of Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Firms, 40 NAT’L TAX J. 71, 79 (1987) 
(finding that empirical results support the proposition that tax exemptions offer nonprofit firms 
“significant advantage[s] in establishing market share”).  Some of this work has been more 
theoretical, examining the various mechanisms nonprofits might use to guard against their besetting 
sins, waste and theft.  See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and 
Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 341–45 (1983) (analyzing mechanisms that nonprofit firms 
have developed to address agency problems created by private donations). 
25. Galle, supra note 1, at 1213–14 (responding to those who would “open[] philanthropy to 
potential profiteering”).  But as we shall see, some of those to whom Galle’s article is addressed 
belong to a more aggressive school.  See infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
26. See Galle, supra note 1, at 1213 (citing Malani & Posner, supra note 3, at 2019–23) 
(explaining that Malani and Posner “argue that philanthropic services could be carried on equally 
well by for-profit firms” and point to the charitable work of Google and other for-profit firms as 
examples). 
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information asymmetries, one would expect, as Hansmann has always noted, 
a mixture of for-profit and nonprofit suppliers.27  The reason for this mixture 
is entirely consistent with Hansmann’s theory: some consumers may suffer 
less from information asymmetries than others; to the extent that consumers 
know more (or think they know more) about the goods and services they are 
buying, they need worry less about buying them from for-profits.28  Stated 
somewhat differently, the more that consumers trust either their own 
evaluations or their suppliers’ reliability, the more consumers will tend to 
patronize for-profits rather than nonprofits.  This latter factor may well 
account for the tendency of “popular” firms like Google and Starbucks to 
attract “donors.” 
But, as Professor Galle argues, we must be careful of the implications 
we draw from this.  In particular, we need to notice two sets of non sequiturs: 
one descriptive, the other normative.  As a descriptive matter, the fact that 
some for-profits seem to enjoy a reputation for reliability does not mean 
either that they are in fact reliable or that, even if they are reliable, they are 
the rule rather than the exception.29  The very prominence of firms like 
Google and Starbucks may mean that third-party monitors (like the press) 
predictably police them at no cost to those who rely on them for goods and 
services that they are not themselves in a good position to monitor.   If 
Starbucks rips people off, that is worthy of the front page of the New York 
Times; if your local latte shop does the same, it is not as likely to attract 
similar attention.30 
If what passes as for-profit charity can be this easily explained within 
Hansmann’s theory itself, then why is so much being made of it?  It would 
seem to warrant, at very most, the equivalent of an epicycle or two in 
Ptolemy’s cosmology, not a Copernican revolution that puts formerly 
peripheral for-profit charity at the center of a new descriptive and normative 
theory of charity.  And many, perhaps most, of the proponents of for-profit 
 
27. See Hansmann, supra note 8, at 70 (noting that cases of complex personal services, such as 
day care and residential nursing care, “may be quite difficult for some consumers to evaluate with 
confidence, thus leading those consumers to seek out nonprofit providers as a form of protection 
against exploitation”). 
28. Id.; see also Hansmann, supra note 6, at 843 (explaining that consumers choose profit-
seeking firms when they can make a reasonably accurate comparison of products and prices and 
reach a clear agreement with chosen firms concerning goods and services). 
29. See Galle, supra note 1, at 1221–22 (asserting that arguments that for-profits are more 
efficient in general overlook the possibility that they will be less efficient than nonprofits in their 
charitable activities). 
30. More generally, we must bear in mind the possibility that even the savviest can be fooled 
some of the time and that some can be fooled—will perhaps even welcome being fooled—all of the 
time.  The most ruthlessly dishonest promisors of delivering relief to the poor may produce the 
highest levels of donor satisfaction by the simple expedient of diverting all donations from real 
relief work to fake but heart-warming before-and-after brochures.  See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 
6, at 878 (acknowledging the possibility that nonprofits may lack incentives to eliminate 
unnecessary expenses).  And this is not to mention diploma-mills—yet. 
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charity are willing to leave things pretty much at that.  They are interested 
only in cataloguing, or at most encouraging, the admittedly exceptional cases 
where for-profits manage to overcome the kinds of contract failure 
Hansmann has identified.  As we have seen, this places them well within an 
old and established branch of Hansmann’s critics, a branch that Hansmann 
himself acknowledged as a needful supplement, even corrective, to his 
contract-failure account. 
Not all proponents of the new for-profit charity, however, are nearly so 
modest.  The more aggressive proponents of for-profit charity take aim at the 
core of Hansmann’s theory itself.  They argue that, contrary to Hansmann’s 
fundamental thesis, the work now being done by even the most distinctive of 
nonprofits like overseas relief organizations could be done more efficiently 
by for-profit firms.31  The great promise of Hansmann’s work was an 
economic account of the role of nonprofits in a basically capitalist market 
economy; on his hypothesis, they arise in a number of special cases of 
contract failure as more efficient alternatives to for-profit firms.32  The more 
aggressive of Hansmann’s new critics take issue with that position.  In their 
words: “An underlying theme of this Essay is that nonprofit firms are less 
efficient than for-profit firms.”33 
Professor Galle nicely maps out the problems that would flow from 
denying Hansmann’s position and, on that basis, extending the charitable 
deduction to gifts made to for-profit charities.34  So effectively does he trace 
these consequences that he leaves us with a lingering, even discomfiting, 
question: If Hansmann’s more aggressive critics have so little to offer, why 
did they offer it?  To get the answer, we must turn from the direction of 
Professor Galle’s critique, which looks to the problems that flow from 
making gifts to for-profit charities tax deductible, and look upstream for the 
source of the notion that for-profits can consistently outperform nonprofits, 
even under conditions of contract failure. 
What, then, is that source?  Answering that question takes us 
immediately to a major division between the aggressive and moderate 
proponents of for-profit charity and, beyond that, between the aggressive 
proponents of for-profit charity and all prior economic analysts of 
 
31. See, e.g., Henderson & Malani, supra note 3, at 590 (positing that corporations are able to 
produce some kinds of altruistic goods more efficiently than nonprofits); Malani & Posner, supra 
note 3, at 2020–22 (explaining inefficiencies linked with nonprofits and arguing that for-profit firms 
would be more efficient). 
32. Hansmann, supra note 6, at 843–45. 
33. Malani & Posner, supra note 3, at 2055.  In the interest of fairness, this is the remainder of 
the quoted sentence: “. . . and that if the law permitted for-profit firms to compete in charitable 
markets, charitable activity would become more efficient.”  Id.  The law, we might note, does not 
generally forbid for-profits to compete with charities in the provision of any goods or services, 
though it does deny for-profit competitors many of the benefits, under the tax law and elsewhere, 
that it allows nonprofits. 
34. Galle, supra note 1, at 1218–30. 
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philanthropy.  The first step in that direction is to recall that economists 
might criticize Hansmann’s model from either of two related directions.  
First, they might argue that charities waste, by sloth or theft, any advantage 
the nondistribution constraint offers them as means of addressing contract 
failure.35  Second, economists critical of Hansmann might argue that 
alternative suppliers, including specially structured for-profit firms, can 
overcome contract failure more efficiently than nonprofit suppliers.36 
Either of these two reciprocal arguments—the latter for the greater 
efficiency of for-profits, the former for the lesser efficiency of nonprofits—
might draw from two sources.  One source, as we have seen, is essentially 
empirical: evidence from studies of either for-profits or nonprofits that cast 
new light “from the field” on their relative efficiency under conditions of 
contract failure.  Again, this is the source from which Hansmann’s more 
moderate critics have generally drawn.37  Consistent with the basic insight of 
his theory, these moderate critics have explored situations where for-profits 
perform better or nonprofits perform worse than his theory would predict. 
But this is not the source from which Hansmann’s more aggressive 
critics draw.  They do, to be sure, take a bow in the direction of empirical 
research on relative efficiency, but it is a very low bow indeed.  They cite a 
single article in the Harvard Business Review.38  And even that article stands 
more as an addition to the moderate critique of Hansmann than as a 
foundation for any more aggressive critique.  This is evident even from their 
own summary (which, it has to be said, is the fullest treatment they give): 
Former U.S. Senator Bill Bradley and consultants from McKinsey & 
Company have estimated that the nonprofit sector wastes $100 billion 
of value annually. They argue that it is possible to recover 
approximately $60 billion of that loss by improving management and 
cutting administrative costs.39 
As this summary rightly reports, the Harvard Business Review article 
suggests that nonprofits may squander any efficiency advantage due to 
operational inefficiencies, a possibility that Hansmann himself admitted in 
his first article.  But the Harvard Business Review article itself gives little 
systematic empirical evidence of this possibility.  What is more, the article 
 
35. See Steinberg, supra note 24, at 126–28 (discussing “voluntary failure” by nonprofit 
managers and the temptation to “choose higher-cost perk-laden means of production”). 
36. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
37. For empirical studies of the relative efficiency of for-profits and nonprofits in particular 
industries, see Steinberg, supra note 24, at 118, 127–30, and Hansmann, supra note 25, at 79. 
38. Bill Bradley et al., The Nonprofit Sector’s $100 Billion Opportunity, HARV. BUS. REV., 
May 2003, at 94. 
39.  Malani & Posner, supra note 3, at 2022 (citing Bradley, supra note 38, at 102) (citations 
omitted); see also id. at 2056 (“Yet the study by former Senator Bradley and consultants from 
McKinsey & Company suggest[s] otherwise [than the conclusion that nonprofits are not very 
efficient].  They find that the nonprofit sector wastes $100 billion of value annually.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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suggests that the remedy for this possible problem is what one branch of 
Hansmann’s moderate critics have long suggested: improving the efficiency 
of nonprofits themselves. 
The Harvard Business Review article is thus, at best, tenuous support 
for the proposition that for-profits are likely, across the board, to be more 
efficient suppliers than nonprofits under conditions of contract failure.  The 
article stands for the proposition that nonprofit performance can be 
improved, not for the proposition that for-profits can deliver the same goods 
and services better than nonprofits as they are, much less as they might be 
modified.  Thus, Hansmann’s more aggressive critics do not attempt to refute 
his contract-failure theory with evidence that for-profits are more trustworthy 
or nonprofits less efficient than his theory suggests; they must, it would 
seem, simply reject his theory on the basis of their own competing theory. 
What competing theory is this?  Note first that it has to be significantly 
narrower than the economic analysis of law.  To appreciate that point, we 
must step back a bit further and look at the history of economic analysis of 
law.  Two academic generations ago, its proponents offered a unified field 
theory of all of law, normative as well as descriptive.40  From its very 
inception, critics have argued that economic analysis of law was either 
circular, reductionist, or both—especially in its normative claims.41  But even 
its critics conceded its elegance,42 and it had both answers for these critics 
and powerful appeal to a second generation of scholars.43 
These latter, in their turn, expanded the basic principles of economic 
analysis to the far horizons of law, even to areas where the insights of 
economics seemed, at best, deeply counterintuitive: family law, 
constitutional law, and nonprofit law.  Hansmann’s work in this last field is a 
paradigm of this second generation of economic analysis.  He offered a 
plausible, if counterintuitive, theory of nonprofit firms as a complement to 
the emerging economic “theory of the firm.”44  His claim to fame, as a 
scholar of nonprofit organizations, was to explain the function of nonprofit 
firms in terms of economic efficiency.  Even as Adam Smith pointed out that 
it is not the generosity of the baker and other tradesfolk that supplies our 
daily bread, so Hansmann explained that the function of even relief 
 
40. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972).  This was nothing if 
not impressive and appealing. 
41. E.g., Arthur Allen Leff, An Economic Analysis  Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. 
L. REV. 451 (1974); Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980). 
42. Leff, supra note 41, at 459. 
43. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 107–15 (1981) (responding to 
Dworkin’s critique of wealth maximization). 
44.  See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 245 (1996) (presenting the idea 
that “[a]s owner control becomes increasingly attenuated in a formally owned firm, the difference 
between such a firm and one that is formally unowned (that is, nonprofit) tends to vanish,” revealing 
that “nonprofit firms are not sharply different from firms that are investor-owned”). 
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organizations like CARE is best understood as efficiently supplying the 
demands of their donors. 
Hansmann’s more aggressive critics are themselves economic analysts, 
but of a much narrower school—one much closer to the Austrians than to 
Adam Smith.  In the view of the Austrian school, for-profit firms are always 
the most efficient providers, even in cases of garden-variety market failure.45  
The basic reason is that government can never be relied upon to correct the 
kind of market failures Hansmann has identified, nor any others.46 
More precisely, Hansmann’s more aggressive critics suggest an 
especially aggressive form of the Austrian antiregulatory school of 
economics.  In its original form, the Austrian school left open the possibility, 
at least in principle, that charities and other third-sector organizations that are 
neither for-profit firms nor state instrumentalities might correct market 
failures.47  The new and more aggressive Austrianism seems determined to 
foreclose that prospect.48  The old Austrian school assumed that government 
was too unreliable to correct market failures, leaving for-profit firms of 
admittedly suboptimal performance the winners by default; the new Austrian 
school assumes that for-profit firms can overcome market failures on their 
own.49  In the old school, for-profit firms, though sometimes beset with 
market failures, are thus a second-best solution; in the new school, for-profit 
firms do not experience market failures nor can they correct those failures 
themselves.50  For-profits thus offer not just the best of all possible worlds, 
but the best of all imaginable worlds. 
Full exploration of that fantastic world will have to be done elsewhere; 
in a comment we can only note three salient points.  First, the new 
Austrianism gives little if any empirical data as the basis for trusting for-
profits more or nonprofits less.  Second, this expanded faith in for-profits—a 
faith that sees for-profits as superior not only to the state but also to charity—
 
45. See LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 659–60 (3rd ed. 
1966) (asserting that, when governments interfere in the market, “[o]utfits producing at higher costs 
are brought into existence or preserved while other outfits producing at lower costs are forced to 
curtail or to discontinue their production,” resulting in “consumers . . . not getting more, but less”). 
46. See id. at 657–58 (conceding the problem of external costs but insisting that “[i]t could be 
removed by a reform of the laws concerning liability for damages inflicted and by rescinding the 
institutional barriers preventing the full operation of private ownership.”); id. at  736 (“Corruption is 
a regular effect of interventionism.”). 
Remember Alan Greenspan (not to mention his mentor, Ayn Rand)?  Edward Rothstein, 
Considering the Last Romantic, Ayn Rand, at 100, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at E1 (noting that 
Greenspan was an acolyte). 
47. See VON MISES, supra note 45, at 837–40 (discussing charitable organizations’ traditional 
role of caring for the indigent despite funding problems resulting from government interference). 
48. See Malani & Posner, supra note 3, at 2022 (proposing new tax measures that “may 
encourage a vast increase in the production of community-benefit goods and services by for-profit 
firms”). 
49. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
50. See Malani & Posner, supra note 3, at 2035–39 (suggesting that for-profit firms can 
overcome market failure by creating contracts with donors). 
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comes at a most opportune time: precisely when everyone else in the world is 
aghast at the havoc apparently wreaked on the entire global economy by the 
very kind of unregulated private firms that the older Austrian school called 
for.  One can but stand in awe of those who would not only reaffirm but 
actually expand such a faith at such a time in the face of such evidence.  Each 
of us, of course, must draw his or her own conclusions here.  Some have seen 
the burgeoning of for-profits in higher education and the extension of federal 
loans to their students as the parallel, in both structure and extent, of the 
subprime mortgage fiasco.  As for me, please pardon a quote from the ever-
dark Hardy: “[W]ith this bright believing band I have no claim to be.”51 
Finally, even those willing and able to make this leap of faith with the 
more aggressive proponents of for-profit charity might balk at the 
prescriptive conclusion they draw from their descriptive premise.  Even if 
some or all for-profits are reliable suppliers in situations where Hansmann 
predicts contract failure, it does not follow that they warrant a tax subsidy.  
On the one hand, maybe charities are special, as some have argued, in ways 
that have little if anything to do with greater efficiency.52  On the other hand, 
even if we assume efficiency to be the sole criterion of comparison, and even 
if we conclude for-profits fare better than nonprofits under that metric, it 
does not follow that we should extend favorable tax treatment to them.  We 
might achieve equal treatment in the opposite direction, by “rounding down” 
rather than “rounding up”: rather than extend the tax subsidy to for-profit 
charity, we would deny the tax subsidy to nonprofit, “charitable” charity.  
Equal treatment of for-profit and nonprofit charity, in other words, could be 
an equality of tax neutrality instead of an equality of tax preference. 
Indeed, on the premise that for-profit charities are systematically more 
efficient than charitable charities, it would seem that we would do even better 
to withdraw the exemption from charitable charities even as we extend it to 
for-profit charities.  We should, in other words, pour good money after good, 
not bad, by placing foregone tax revenues in the hands of efficient for-profit 
charities, not their inefficient charitable competitors.  But on the implicit 
Austrianism of for-profits’ more radical proponents, even that would be a 
distant second-best.  Given ex hypothesi that both government (as supplier 
and purchaser) and charities are less efficient than for-profits, we would 
presumably do best to not subsidize production and, in the bargain, lower 
taxes as much as possible.53 
 
51. Thomas Hardy, The Impercipient, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH 
LITERATURE 1935 (M. H. Abrams & Stephen Greenblatt eds., 7th ed. 2000). 
52.  See John Simon, et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations (“The most 
traditional of the normative arguments for a subsidy theory holds that exemption and deductibility 
are needed to promote the provision [by charities] of certain kinds of benefits to the public.”), in 
THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 267, 274. 
53. Just to be clear: This last is a reductio, not a recommendation. 
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Galle’s article, I should say, does not press these three most salient 
points against the new Austrians.  In dealing with this more aggressive 
school of charitable charity’s critics, Galle has been, in my estimation, too 
charitable.  That charge brings me to the greatest of differences between us: I 
find Professor Galle much too charitable, not only toward the Austrians’ for-
profit charity, but also toward his own charitable charity. 
II. Cannons to the Left of Him: Questioning Professor Galle’s Quest for 
More Charitable Charity. 
“Everyone,” Professor Galle begins his paper, “likes charity.”54  But, as 
the very presence of the more aggressive proponents of for-profit charity 
implies, not everyone thinks as highly of charitable charity as he.  The more 
aggressive proponents of for-profit charity question the efficiency of 
charitable charity, even under conditions of contract failure—and that should 
also lead them to question its entitlement to a tax subsidy.  Nor, I now have 
to admit, are they alone in that apparently “bah-humbug” position.  The 
prospect of eliminating the favorable tax treatment of Galle’s “charitable” 
charity takes us beyond his disagreement with the proponents of for-profit 
charity, both moderate and aggressive, and brings us to his disagreement 
with—pardon the first-person singular—me. 
The more aggressive proponents of for-profit charity, as we have seen, 
might well oppose special tax favors to all charity (or anything else) because 
they believe nonprofits and government both involve inefficiencies compared 
to for-profits, charitable or otherwise.  But one may join them in opposing 
tax favors for all charities, charitable or otherwise, for a reason very different 
from theirs: both for-profit and nonprofit charities displace a third possible 
supplier of goods and services that are potentially beset by contract failure—
government itself.55  What is more, government may often be a superior 
alternative to both charitable and for-profit charity.  That singularly 
unpopular position is my own.  As a part of what may be a vanishing 
minority, I question the premise of the joke, “I’m from the government, and 
I’m here to help you.”56 
Charitable charity has doubters, that is to say, on the political left as 
well as the economic right.  Those on the right include those we have called 
proponents of for-profit charity; those on the left include proponents of what 
I would call republican philanthropy.  These latter include, to name only a 
 
54. Galle, supra note 1, at 1213. 
55. See WEISBROD, supra note 20, at 31 (noting that “[t]he effect of a donation . . . on the level 
of tax-financed governmental expenditures is not yet known” and that “increased private donations 
may decrease what government would otherwise have done”). 
56. I am indeed from the government—specifically, the Florida State University College of 
Law—and I truly believe I am here, in this debate about how best to serve the common weal, to 
help you. 
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few, George Washington,57 Thomas Jefferson,58 the Emperor Trajan,59 and, at 
least on the vital issue of education, the philanthropist Warren Buffet.60  As 
these examples suggest, doubters of charity cover a huge swath of history 
and a very wide political spectrum.  Viewed more positively, doubting the 
merits of charity may be seen as an ancient and honorable position among 
those whose politics are defensibly republican.61  Their positive point of 
agreement is in their confidence that the state itself is the preferred provider 
of a more-or-less wide range of essential goods and services. 
This is not the place to spell out in detail the pro-government preference 
of republican philanthropy.62  But from that perspective we can see several 
aspects of Professor Galle’s case for keeping charity charitable in a usefully 
different light.  Most obviously, several of his answers to charitable charity’s 
more aggressive, “Austrian” opponents carry little weight with my 
republican doubters.  For example, Professor Galle argues that measures 
favorable to for-profit charity over charitable charity would strengthen the 
state against both.63  That argument would certainly appeal to those 
mistrustful of the state.  But it is hardly persuasive to either social-
democratic64 or neo-classically republican philanthropists, both of whom 
 
57. See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and 
Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600–2000 (noting Washington’s extensive warnings 
about voluntary associations in his Farewell Address), in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 32, 35. 
58.  See id. (“Southern states, influenced by Jefferson’s concerns about ‘un-republican’ 
institutions, were particularly hostile to private corporations, associations, and charities.”). 
59.  See THE LETTERS OF THE YOUNGER PLINY 272 (Betty Radice trans., 1963) (explaining, in 
a letter from Trajan to Hadrian, that government supply of fire-fighting equipment is safer than 
authorizing of voluntary fire brigades, which, like associations of all kinds, “soon turn into a 
political club”). 
60. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Rick Lyman, Buffett’s Billions Will Aid Fight Against Disease, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/us/27gates.html? 
scp=39&sq=warren%20buffett%20public%20education&st=cse (reporting on Warren Buffett’s $31 
billion donation to the Gates Foundation, which plans to use the money in part to “create[] model 
schools that public school systems can use as examples, rather than spending endlessly to pay the 
expenses of every impoverished American school district”). 
61.  See Hall, supra note 57, at 35 (“The centrality and effectiveness of voluntary associations 
in the Revolution served to kindle hostility toward them after the war, as Americans sought to 
establish governmental and legal institutions based on democratic principles.”). 
62. See generally Rob Atkinson, Philanthropy and the Federal Income Tax: Should Our 
Republic Underwrite de Tocqueville’s Democracy? (March 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=robert_atkinson. 
63. See Galle, supra note 1, at 1219 (arguing that monitoring costs would be shifted to for-
profit charities under Malani and Posner’s model, placing them “at a disadvantage relative to the 
government sector,”); id. at 1225 (indicating that favoring for-profit charities under Malani and 
Posner’s model would decrease the social rewards of working for a charity thereby making charities 
less efficient in their competition with the government). 
64. See Steven Rathgeb Smith & Kirsten A. Gronbjerg, Scope and Theory of Government-
Nonprofit Relations (“The dominance of this particular ideology [holding that government crowds 
out initiatives in the other two sectors] is evident in the extent to which arguments to privatize 
government and reduce taxes carry the day in the political discourse and public-opinion polls.”), in 
THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 24, at 221, 228. 
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would welcome not only greater state regulation of for-profits but also 
displacement of charitable charity’s provision of many goods and services by 
state provision.65 
Similarly, some of the evidence that Professor Galle adduces in favor of 
his own position is, from the perspective of those who do not accept the 
premises of that position, close to tautological.  Consider his claim that 
charitable charities promote diversity.66  If by diversity we mean multiplicity 
of views about the public good and the means of its advancement, both the 
philanthropic sector itself and the likely variety within it certainly adds 
diversity to the necessarily somewhat monolithic presence of the modern 
state.  Thus, according to one commentator: “The voluntary sector achieves 
diversity through the very diversity of its institutions.”67 
But what is true in general may well not be true in every case.  In a 
region like the American South where many well-off white children attend 
white-flight academies, the appearance of yet another white-flight academy, 
rather than expansion or improvement of a racially integrated public school, 
is hardly a triumph for diversity by any less circular definition.  Similarly, the 
opening of a NATO-sponsored secular school in Afghanistan would appear 
to promote diversity in a very different way from the opening of yet another 
fundamentalist madrassa sponsored by the pet philanthropy of a member of 
the House of Saud.  To those not already committed to nonprofit over 
governmental provision, automatically equating nonprofit provision with 
increased diversity seems at least a little circular. 
None of this is to say that Professor Galle’s arguments against for-profit 
charity are logically flawed.  It is, rather, to note that many of them rest on a 
premise not all opponents of for-profit charity share: that charitable charity is 
preferable to republican philanthropy.  Nor do I mean to fault Professor Galle 
for not addressing more of Keep Charity Charitable to this latter position.  
He has, again, made his general case for charitable charity elsewhere.68  
 
65. See Atkinson, supra note 62, at 69 (indicating that under a neoclassical republican 
philanthropy, the direct state provision of publicly beneficial goods and services would be 
expanded); Rob Atkinson, Philanthropy’s Future: Questioning Today’s Orthodoxies, Re-Affirming 
Yesterday’s Foundations 45 (March 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=robert_atkinson (stating that 
the Abrahamist Republic “would police, with far more vigor than contemporary governments in 
either Europe or America, the kind of financial brinksmanship that produced the current recession 
by systemically unsustainable shifting of private risks onto the public”); id. at 47 (indicating that the 
Abrahamist Republic would have “a very big budget,” particularly due to its provision of universal 
education and public works employment). 
66. See Galle, supra note 1, at 1215 (noting that the deduction for charitable contributions may 
be viewed as “a federal subsidy to the recipient firms,” which is “justified as a tool for encouraging 
the production of goods that would otherwise be underproduced by the private market”); id. at 1230 
(stating that when the for-profit and charitable sectors are mixed, “the diversity of charities’ size and 
focus” is diminished). 
67. James Douglas, Political Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: 
A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 43, 46 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1st ed. 1987). 
68. Galle, supra note 2. 
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Further, proponents of bigger government, interesting though they may be as 
a matter of conceptual clarity or historical completeness, are hardly a high 
priority, practically speaking, in contemporary politics.  As a practical 
matter, republican philanthropy—along with allied ideas like the “public 
option” in health care—may safely be relegated to footnotes.69 
III. Keeping Republics Republican: Remembering the Alamo (and Thanking 
Goodness for the University of Texas) 
The marginal political relevance of bigger-government proponents 
conceded, allow me to savor a single, but I think singular, irony to be found 
in the actual locus of this three-way debate about the proper place of charity.  
The host for this phase of that debate is the University of Texas School of 
Law, which is neither the kind of charitable charity that Professor Galle 
defends nor the kind of for-profit charity that he criticizes.  It is, rather, an 
instrumentality of the state, of which, as we have seen, both Professor Galle 
and his opponents appear to be equally dubious as an alternative source for 
the kind of goods and services charities have traditionally delivered.70  For 
both Professor Galle and his opponents, the state and its agencies are, in the 
provision of goods like this very debate, presumably seldom better than 
second-best.  For Professor Galle, the best is charitable charity; for his 
opponents, for-profit charity. 
Republican philanthropy sees the Texas Law Review in a very different 
light, not as the second- or third-best, but as the ideal.  It is the kind of state 
instrumentality that not only does the work of traditional charity best but also 
exemplifies what the state itself should do, even be.  To get at that ideal, we 
need to note a deeper irony: the debate the Texas Law Review has sponsored 
is an almost perfect testing ground for the “twin failure theory” of nonprofit 
organizations.  In that theory, consumers turn to nonprofits for products that, 
for identifiable reasons, neither for-profit firms nor the state adequately 
supplies.  Nonprofits are thus a response to market failure on the one hand 
and government failure on the other.71 
 
69. If it is not omitted altogether, along with those of monarchists, Trotskyites, and (until 
relatively recently) the Austrian branch of neoclassical economics.  But I clearly counted the last of 
these out too quickly.  I wrote this section on the second day Senate Republicans blocked all 
consideration of financial reform, well more than a year after the onset of the current financial 
crisis.  See Edward Wyatt & David M. Herszenhorn, 2 Votes Break Logjam on Financial Overhaul 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/business/ 
economy/06regulate.html (stating that the Senate’s approval of two amendments to a financial 
regulatory bill “broke a logjam that had paralyzed the Senate floor for much of the last week”). 
70. The Texas Law Review itself, though formally organized as a tax-exempt charitable 
organization, is nonetheless an official scholarly organ of the University of Texas School of Law.  I 
owe my editor, Tracey Bamberger, the credit for pointing out this distinction. 
71. See JAMES DOUGLAS, WHY CHARITY?: THE CASE FOR A THIRD SECTOR 160 (1983) 
(referring to early versions of the standard theory of nonprofits’ function as “the twin failure 
theory”); Steinberg, supra note 24, at 119 (referring to “the stream of literature that has become 
known as ‘three-failures theory’” because it accounts for each social sector—for-profit, nonprofit, 
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To appreciate the market-failure half of that theory, we need first to 
follow economic analysis in considering this debate as a product, a good or 
service to be produced and sold.  As soon as we take that perspective, we see 
that our debate and its constituent scholarly articles are paradigms of 
products subject to both of the market failures that Hansmann identified as 
contract failure.  On the one hand, our debate involves the problem of 
information asymmetry.  This debate could easily take place on the Web as 
postings to various freestanding blogs.  But those not well versed in the law 
and economics of charity would be at a distinct disadvantage in following the 
debate.72 
Even more than this information asymmetry, the product the Texas Law 
Review is offering in this debate manifests Hansmann’s other major source of 
contract failure: external benefits.  As economic analysts of nonprofits after 
Hansmann have noted, ideas about the common good, which lie at the core of 
our debate about the proper locus of charity, are among the purer forms of 
public good.73  Unable effectively to “charge” all those who benefit from this 
debate and similar public goods, for-profit firms predictably undersupply 
them. 
These information asymmetries and external benefits, however, are only 
the market-failure half of the standard twin failure theory of nonprofit 
organizations.  The other half addresses an equally basic question: In the case 
of information asymmetries and external benefits, why doesn’t the 
government step in to regulate for-profit production in the first case and, if 
necessary, provide the good or service itself in the second?  The answer is 
that the state often does step in but, in a democracy, only up to the level 
demanded by the marginal voter.  Those voters who want more or better 
output than what a majority of their fellow citizens are willing to vote for 
must turn to other suppliers.  In markets where for-profits are either 
unreliable (on account of information asymmetries) or unavailable (in the 
case of public goods), voters must turn to nonprofit suppliers—Professor 
Galle’s charitable charity. 
We have, of course, come full circle.  Here, as Hansmann’s theory 
suggests, nonprofits may well be the best available supplier.  And so, as he 
and others have pointed out, many universities are what Professor Galle 
would call “charitable charities.”  That, I think it is fair to say, is the “Ivy 
 
and governmental—as responses to failures of the other two); see also BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE 
NONPROFIT ECONOMY 16–25, 33–41 (1991) (assessing the relative merits of for-profit firms, then 
government, and finally nonprofits). 
72. Given the vast amounts of information on the Web, they would face a paradox: To find 
what they need to know, they would have to know it or, at the very least, its reliable sources 
already.  To fully appreciate the arguments involved, they would need to go to law school to 
become legal scholars themselves. 
73. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 701, 713 (1996) (“Several articles describe a person as a ‘pure altruist’ who cares only 
about the benefits flowing to others or about the overall level of some public good.”). 
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League” model.  All across New England, and down into the mid-Atlantic 
states as well, the greater universities and the greater law schools are private, 
nonprofit institutions—Professor Galle’s charitable charities.  Not to choose 
examples entirely at random, consider both Professor Galle’s law alma mater 
and mine, Harvard and Yale, respectively.  Both those schools, we would do 
well to remember, had their origins as training grounds for the clergy of a 
narrow sect of Puritan Protestantism.74  And so from the principal podium at 
Yale College, its President, the Reverend Timothy Dwight, urged his flock 
not to elect the atheist Jefferson President lest “[w]e may see the Bible cast 
into a bonfire . . . and our children . . . uniting in chanting mockeries against 
God.”75 
Reverend Dwight may have overstated citizen Jefferson’s theological 
unorthodoxy, but the differences in their visions of both higher education and 
the common weal would have been hard to exaggerate.  Jefferson’s ideal 
university was to be at least nonsectarian, if not secular; it was to be publicly 
funded and tuition free, at least for the poor76; it was to produce statesmen 
trained, as Jefferson himself had been at the College of William and Mary, 
more in the classics than in the scriptures, with an eye toward law rather than 
theology.  It was, in short, to produce succeeding generations of Jeffersons, 
children of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, citizens working to 
create a new order of the ages77 by the light of human reason—not parsing 
sectarian tracts to discern the divine will to better usher in the millennium.  In 
Jefferson’s republican vision, the Commonwealth and its university were 
 
74. Thus, as Lester Salamon points out: 
In colonial Massachusetts, for example, the commonwealth government not only 
enacted a special tax for support of Harvard College but also paid part of the salary of 
the president until 1781 and elected the college’s Board of Overseers until after the 
Civil War.  The state of Connecticut had an equally intimate relationship with Yale, 
and the state’s governor, lieutenant governor, and six state senators sat on the Yale 
Corporation from the founding of the school until the late 1800s. 
Partners in Public Service  The Scope and Theory of Government–Nonprofit Relations, in THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 99, 100.  See also Hall, supra 
note 57, at 34 (“Such institutions as Harvard, William and Mary, and Yale were regarded [in 
colonial America] as public corporations, subject to legislative oversight and supported significantly 
in the form of legislative grants of money, real estate, and ‘privileges,’ which included levying 
special taxes and a monopoly on ferry operations.”); id. at 39 (“Both Harvard and Yale, with 
significant representation of elected officials on their governing boards, were not private as we 
understand the term, though both would replace the ex officios with elected alumni representatives 
by 1870.”). 
75. See Tim Hackler, God and Man at Monticello  How Jefferson Beat the Religious Right, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1993, at C3 (quoting Rev. Dwight). 
76. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO 243 (1970) 
(“[T]he goal he hoped ultimately to reach was the establishment of a state-wide system of public 
education that would provide instruction at all levels.”). 
77. A phrase not accidentally inscribed on the obverse side of the dollar bill and the Great Seal 
of the United States in the language of Cicero and Seneca: Novus ordo seclorem.  Charles McC. 
Mathias, Jr., Ordered Liberty  The Original Intent of the Constitution, 47 MD. L. REV. 174, 174 
(1987). 
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absolutely inseparable, almost indistinguishable.  And if Jefferson’s 
standards were not those of the Bible or the prayer book, neither were they 
the standards of consumer preference or majority will.  He famously placed 
certain principles above political debate; if their foundation is hard to find in 
his natural law, it is easy to see in the classics of traditional republicanism. 
Eventually, of course, even those bastions of Calvinist orthodoxy, 
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, came around to Jefferson’s secular standards 
of academic merit.  But the struggle about another vital issue—their mode of 
funding—is very much with us today.  From Jefferson’s day to ours, the 
finest university in the Commonwealth of Virginia has been the 
Commonwealth’s own flagship university.  In Jefferson’s conception, its 
foundation was the income and capital of the Commonwealth, justly levied 
and wisely invested, not the spare change of charitable sponsors, individual 
or corporate, given at whim and spent under the most permissive of 
standards. 
The University of Virginia is the Jeffersonian paradigm and prototype, 
but it is hardly the sole individual of its species.  Higher education across the 
whole of the South and West bears his mark—nowhere more than here in the 
Southwest with Texas and its own flagship university.  California and 
Michigan are all but broke nowadays, and the Commonwealth of Virginia 
has essentially ceded the law school at Mr. Jefferson’s own public university 
to a private elite.78  The University of Texas stands, if you will pardon the 
allusion, as virtually the lone star in what was once a firmament of truly 
Jeffersonian universities, all models of republican philanthropy. 
What, we have to wonder, has made Texas special and especially 
hospitable to republican philanthropy?  Why, more specifically, has Texas 
not succumbed, at least in this regard, to “government failure”?  It is surely a 
long and complex story, but running through it all are the necessary 
conditions for republican philanthropy: citizens’ desire for excellence above 
both what the market produces (compare the University of Phoenix) and 
what private philanthropy can provide at affordable prices (compare, again, 
Yale and Harvard).  And what is the proof of that?  Think again of  this very 
debate in the real and virtual pages of the Texas Law Review.79 
And remember the Alamo.  Colonel Travis’s troops there, volunteers 
though they were, did not serve for free and did not pack their own lunches.   
Nor did the nascent Republic of Texas raise funds for salaries and supplies 
with either a veterans’ auxiliary bake sale or an alumni phone-a-thon.  The 
Republic the Alamo defended did not rely on the passing of the proverbial 
 
78. One would not want to press the coincidence too far, but it may be worth noting that, even 
as Professor Galle’s article appears here, the principal paper propounding for-profit charity appears 
in the Virginia Law Review.  Malani & Posner, supra note 3. 
79. Another source of possible bias to disclose: This is not my first time in these pages.  See 
Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 259 
(1995). 
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hat to fund its defense.  It taxed and spent—as wisely and as well as the 
education of its citizens enabled.  And those citizens, in establishing their 
university, built what must be the ultimate bastion of any real republic.  As 
Jefferson once observed, no people can long remain both ignorant and free;80 
for him it followed a fortiori that providing the education necessary to 
guarantee that freedom is the fundamental duty of the state.  If republican 
philanthropy could be stated in a sentence, that would be it. 
This brings me to a final irony.  I have said that I find no absurdity in 
the statement “I am from the government, and I’m here to help you.”  You 
yourself know that that statement cannot be totally absurd; you are reading 
this, as you have read Professor Galle’s article, in an official organ of the 
State of Texas.  Texas has long been a polity of republican philanthropy, 
attested not only by your University and your Alamo, but also by your 
ballets, your operas, and your museums.  But I come not from Texas but to 
Texas; what is more and worse, I come not from another model of properly 
republican government but from Florida, which is more nearly the opposite.81 
In contrast with neoclassically republican Texas, Florida is more a 
congeries of demographic deadbeats and subverters of the social contract.  
Many Floridians, having had the taxpayers of Midwestern states educate their 
children, conveniently absconded to Florida when it came time for them, in 
their turn, to pay to educate the next generation.  And many Floridians, 
having fled either Communist or Fascist terror elsewhere in the Caribbean 
Basin, now vote consistently against the kind of state services necessary to 
sustain America as a republic “with liberty and justice for all.”82  Their 
combined votes have helped make America long on negative liberty and 
nominally equal justice, even as they have drawn our reserves of patriotic 
fraternity down to zero, if not below.  We must forgive them, of course, for 
they know not what they do, having never studied in citizen Jefferson’s 
republican schools.  But how, we have to ask ourselves, can they appreciate 
his prophesy: No people can long remain both ignorant and free.83 
 
80. Rob Atkinson, Law as a Learned Profession  The Forgotten Mission Field of the 
Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. REV. 621, 622 (2001). 
81. From this populist Florida, my message thus comes to republican Texas.  Thankfully for us 
all, things have not always run in this coals-to-New Castle direction.  The long-time dean of my law 
school, Donald W. Weidner, is a proper export of the University of Texas School of Law, a veteran 
of the Texas Law Review.  What Jefferson, father of republican public education, hoped to do with 
every generation of Virginians, your alma mater has done with at least one transplanted Brooklyn 
boy.  Thanks to you and to Dean Weidner, your public university and its republican philanthropy 
are the model of the law school that he has built, and I have served.  May your star ever remain our 
cynosure. 
82. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
83. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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The state that employs me spends less per capita on education than any 
other in the nation.84  My South Carolinian parents could always say, faced 
with public schools of the sorriest sort, “thank goodness for Mississippi.”  
We now have a different byword for the ultimate in educational 
backwardness.  It is the adopted homeland of summer soldiers and sunshine 
patriots, a fact ironically reflected in its official nickname: The Sunshine 
State.  Floridians are today’s grasshoppers; Texans are the ants of yesterday 
and tomorrow.  We heed the proverbs of neither the classics85 nor the 
scriptures;86 you tax yourselves to teach your children the wisdom of both.87 
This is not to say, of course, that the Jeffersonian ideal has no place for 
charitable charity, even in the case of higher education.  Some citizens will 
presumably want to study in the comfort, not to say confines, of their 
particular religious communities; those communities will doubtlessly want to 
preserve the traditions of their cult and culture.  Charitable charity 
universities, both sectarian and secular, may also serve as a kind of cultural 
ark, insurance against a rising populist flood that could conceivably swamp 
state educational institutions.  Even republican Texas, sad to say, is not 
immune to populist pressures; imagine, for a chastening moment, the 
curriculum of the University of Texas School of Law being set by the same 
agency that selects Texas’s primary and secondary school curriculum.88  The 
wealthy, with charitable but not republican inclinations, will doubtlessly 
continue to build institutional monuments to their particular educational 
preferences.89  And, of course, the option of admission to elite, if out-of-state, 
charitable charities like Harvard and Yale may relieve political pressure on 
 
84. Matthew Haggman & Michael Vasquez, Florida Puts Little Investment Into Its Universities, 
MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 22, 2010), http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/08/22/1787013/florida-puts-
little-investment.html. 
85. See JEAN DE LA FONTAINE, The Grasshopper and the Ant, in FABLES OF LA FONTAINE l 
(Elizur Wright, Jr. trans., 1842); JERRY PINKNEY, The Grasshopper and the Ants, in AESOP’S 
FABLES 12 (2000). 
86. Proverbs 6:6 (Revised Standard Version) (“Go to the ant, O sluggard; consider her ways, 
and be wise.”). 
87. I must, of course, acknowledge an obvious, and entirely fair, objection to all this: It rests on 
Texas legend, not Texas history.  Mine is the narrative of a Texas mythologized most aggressively.  
But not, I think, egregiously.  To see why not, imagine telling a parallel tale about Florida: Arise, 
retirees of Del Boca Vista!  Take up your croquet mallets and your shuffleboard sticks!  Storm the 
ramparts of mediocrity!  Tales of patriots from the farthest reaches of France rallying to Paris to 
save the Republic are probably at least a little taller than the historical record can fully sustain.  But 
no imaginable Marseillaise could inspire any such march on Tallahassee.  Nor, I hasten to say, is 
this because the denizens of Del Boca Vista are old; we have no trouble believing that the home 
guard of Sparta, equally grey, held off an alien army.  It is not a matter of age; it is a matter of 
culture.  Florida is not the hinterland, much less the heartland, of any revolution nor, for that matter, 
even the real homeland of most of its inhabitants.  It is rather the last retreat from social obligation; 
beyond it lies only the sea and the grave.  Last retreat, that is, in a southerly direction; there is, much 
closer to Texas, the equally compelling example of Arizona. 
88. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Conservatives Seek Deeper Stamp on Texts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 11, 2010, at A20 (discussing the extreme politicization of the Texas Board of Education). 
89. Examples include Duke, Stanford, Vanderbilt, and, of course, Texas’s own Rice. 
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Texas’s own graduate schools to admit the less than stellar scions of 
powerful and prominent local families.90  But again, the Jeffersonian ideal 
would remain at the center: the institutional equivalents of the University of 
Texas. 
IV. Conclusion: Give Me That Old Time Republic (of Texas) 
The basic challenge for nonprofit theorists has long been to create a 
model that explains the role of nonprofits vis-à-vis for-profit firms on the one 
hand and governmental agencies on the other.91  Professor Galle’s Keep 
Charity Charitable nicely corrects one reductionist distortion of that model—
one that assumes, on the thinnest of evidence if not wholly a priori, that for-
profit firms are typically more efficient than both traditional charity and 
republican government.  In doing so, Professor Galle draws on his own more 
positive contribution to that larger project.  In that contribution, he may 
commit the opposite error of those whom he corrects here; he may, that is, 
favor nonprofits over both for-profits and government without adequate 
evidence of his own. 
Thankfully, the very appearance of his fine article in the Texas Law 
Review reminds us of the profoundly important role of a philanthropy that is 
neither private nor for-profit but properly public, neoclassically republican.  
Properly republican institutions—those run by the best qualified in pursuit of 
public ends, res publica, above both majority will and consumer 
satisfaction—sometimes deliver what they alone can dare to promise.  
Thanks to Texas Law Review, we have Professor Galle’s excellent work in 
hand; the dialogue it has sponsored keeps the public good—the ultimate end 
of both his charitable charity and my republican philanthropy—firmly in 
view.  That dialogue is the foundation of every republic, all the way back to 
Plato’s. 
Our forum being higher-tech than Plato’s, picture with me a final 
PowerPoint slide: Delacroix’s Liberty Leading the People.  My 
republicanism being neoclassical but not antiquarian, you will forgive a little 
Photoshopping.  I will have transplanted Ms. Liberty and her beleaguered 
band of republican brothers from the barricades of Paris to the ramparts of 
the Alamo.  Also, I will have “cut” the French tricolor in Liberty’s up-thrust 
arm and “pasted” in its place the Lone Star Flag.92  Now, with a nod to 
 
90. George W. Bush was rejected from the University of Texas School of Law, but he was 
accepted into Harvard Business School.  Frontline  The Choice 2000  George W. Bush  
Chronology, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/choice2000/bush/ 
cron.html. 
91. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 24, at 119–27 (documenting the three-failures theory). 
92. Cf. Maureen Dowd, A Blue Burka for Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at A27 (indicating 
that Attorney General John Ashcroft “had decided to throw the equivalent of a blue burka” over the 
statue of Justice, which is “buxom and partly nude under a toga”).  Given the likely number of 
neoconservative, as opposed to neoclassical, republicans among See Also’s readership, perhaps also 
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multimedia messages, hear, just above the strains of the Ninth Symphony, 
this voice-over: 
Pack your oxymoronic “private charity,” both for-profit and nonprofit, 
back into the carpetbag it came from.  Thank you just the same but 
we’re not buying.  We’ll keep what is truly and rightly ours already: 
the republican philanthropy nowhere better embodied than in the 
University of Texas. 
Then last, and a little louder, “Vive la Republique!”—which is, of 
course, just French for “Hook ‘em Horns!”93 
 
add a chastening and immaculate sash across Liberty’s unabashedly naked breasts in Delacroix’s 
original. 
93. Finally, again in the name of full disclosure: I heard that phrase most recently from my 
daughter, Jane, just back from her apartment-hunting visit to Austin in preparation for her 
enrollment in the Master’s in Social Work program at the University of Texas, not surprisingly one 
of the finest of its kind in the world.  She plans to specialize in international social work; that has to 
mean taking UT’s message of republican philanthropy to the far corners of the earth.  Surely both 
Sam Houston and Lyndon Johnson would join me in saluting that. 
